I've been reading & thinking about these subjects in depth for
decades, and here are my current conclusions (that are as always subject
to change per new data & reasoning). I'll number these replies and
the sections within them so you can refer to them easily if you reply:
1) The existence or nonexistence of deities and immortal souls are
untestable propositions, therefore outside the scope of empirical
science. Attempts to obtain answers by logical inference are subject to
irreducible emotional bias for or against, therefore not useful either.
2) Natural variation in beliefs on these issues is inherent in
individuals, in a manner analogous to sexual orientation. This is the
basis for the unalienable right to freedom of belief in these matters
and society must respect these individual variations.
3) The foregoing does not get us a scientific answer to the
questions of deities or immortal souls. All it gets us is the basis for
freedom of belief in these areas.
4) Objectively, science is necessarily agnostic or uncertain on
these issues. I use the word "uncertainism" to describe my position on
these issues.
More to come momentarily, stick around...
------------------------
Part 2, numbering below for specific points:
1) The foundation of the belief that free will does not exist, is a
belief variously known as hard determinism or superdeterminism. That
belief is unfalsifiable, therefore also outside the realm of science.
It's a metaphysical view or as I would say, a type of religious view
even if it rejects the existence of deities etc.
2) The Standard Model in physics has been supported by more and
better empirical data than just about any other theory in science. At
the root of the SM, is quantum mechanics, that contains irreducible
uncertainties about the behaviors of particles from the subatomic scale
through the atomic scale and arguably into the molecular scale under
certain constraints. (In fact we know from empirical findings, that QM
phenomena occur at the biological scale, about which more to come
shortly.)
3) The fundamental uncertainties embodied in QM must necessarily
have causal relationships with phenomena at larger scales of
observation, even if or where these relationships are statistically
swamped out by classical physical effects.
4) In order for hard determinism to be correct, some hypothetical
mechanism beyond the statistics of large numbers must intervene at some
hypothetical point between the QM scale and the classical scale. No
such mechanism has been shown to exist.
5) Taking into account the statistics of scaling to large numbers
(QM to classical scale), it's reasonable to conclude that some degree of
QM indeterminacy has causal bearing upon classical events, even if the
degree thereof decreases in magnitude to the point of being unobservable
in actual measurements of classical-scale phenomena.
6) Hard determinism usually rests on a logical arguement to the
effect that "if we had complete knowledge of the status of every
particle at the moment of the Big Bang, we could predict with a high
order of certainty any subsequent event in the development of the
universe, right down to the question of what you're going to eat at your
next meal."
7) The argument in (6) would necessarily require the existence of
sensors and computing capacity at the moment of the Big Bang: the
existence of something that preceded the existence of our natural
universe. By definition, anything that is said to exist above, beyond,
or before the natural universe is supernatural.
8) Thus, hard determinism rests on the entailment of a set of
supernatural objects to perform the measuring and calculating. Also by
definition, supernatural objects are outside the scope of empirical
science, therefore not admissible into scientific arguements.
9) Further, hard determinists can and sometimes do argue that any
empirical results that appear to falsify hard determinism, are invalid
because they themselves are the outcome of hard deterministic processes.
In other words, hard determinists themselves argue that their
proposition is unfalsifiable.
10) Therefore it's clear that hard determinism itself is not a
scientific proposition but a metaphysical one, or as I would say, a
religious one (a matter of deeply-held personal belief).
Stay tuned, more to come shortly...
-------------------------
Part 3: Brain Mind and Consciousness
1) Mind and consciousness as experienced, are the product of at
minimum three types of activity, two of which are part of the mainstream
canon of neuroscience, and one of which is theoretical but is being
supported by new data.
2) One of these is deterministic and predictable within certain
limits: the electrical activity of neurons, abstracted as binary
switching of signals. This is what we measure with the EEG and other
measures of electrical activity in brains. It can be replicated in
classical computing models on silicon platforms, and this gives rise to
two hubricious and erroneous conclusions: a) that the other elements of
neural computation can be treated likewise, and that b) cognition is
therefore hard deterministic.
3) One of these is deterministic but chaotic, and therefore
unpredictable even in theory as well as in practice: the "chemical
computation" of neurotransmitters, neuropeptides, neurohormones, and
psychoactive drugs and their endogenous equivalents. This component can
be simulated in software, but the simulation is not replication: at
most it is an approximation, and since it does not use actual chemicals
and receptors, it does not have the capacity to endow the classical
platform with subjective experience.
4) Importantly, this "chemical computation" is the mechanism of
emotion. Emotions are the subjective sensations of the effects of
neurochemicals on neurons. This point is relevant to constraints upon
free will, as I'll come back to in a subsequent comment.
5) The mechanism that is still theoretical is quantum mechanical
computation, carried out at the level of tubulin proteins in the
microtubules that are conventionally thought to be only structural
elements that make up the cytoskeletons of neurons. For more on this,
look up "Orchestrated Objective-Reduction" (abbreviated as "Orch-OR") by
Roger Penrose (yes, that Penrose) and Stuart Hameroff.
If Orch-OR is correct, it provides a physical mechanism for free
will, based ultimately on QM indeterminacy. I'll come back to this in a
subsequent comment as well.
6) Orch-OR was initially criticized on the grounds that QM processes
do not scale to the level of biology, and cannot be operative at
biological temperatures. This criticism was falsified by two findings
from independent areas of research, unrelated to Orch-OR: One, that QM
processes are operative in plant photosynthesis, in choosing the most
efficient path for each photon relative to chlorophyll molecules in
leaves. Two, that QM processes are operative in the optical systems of
birds, and provide a means by which birds gain a visual representation
of magnetic force lines such as the Earth's magnetic field, that in turn
is used in avian navigation including migration.
7) As a result of all of the above, I believe it will be found to be
true that consciousness as-experienced is the outcome of the
combination of all of these processes.
8) The foregoing does not make any claim as to the existence or
nonexistence of an immortal soul. Immortality presupposes eternity,
which is an unmeasurable quantity, therefore not accessible to empirical
treatment
-----------------------------
Part 4 Free Will
1) Consciousness as-experienced can be treated in science as the
outcome of two sets of known/confirmed processes, one theoretical
process that is getting empirical support both directly and indirectly,
and potentially some other physical processes that are not yet
theorized. Consciousness may or may not also involve elements that are
beyond the scope of the physical sciences, such as the soul of
traditional religion, but those elements are not essential to my
arguement.
2) In summary, the three known and within-science theorized elements
can be categorized as a) deterministic/predictable, b)
deterministic/unpredictable, and c) nondeterministic/unpredictable.
This gives rise to a "mixed will" scenario, that appears to be borne
out in the nearly-universal subjective experience of humans.
3) Certain types of cognitive processes have the subjective
characteristic of "inevitability," in the sense that their progress from
start to finish is entirely predictable, or at minimum is
"retrodictable," in that we can "retrodictively" trace their causal
route from start to finish. These are deterministic processes, most
likely the result primarily of the "electrical computing" between
neurons.
An obvious example of this is reasoning in accord with a defined
system of logic. Given "the facts and the laws" (term of art from
philosophy meaning "a set of empirical facts and a set of laws of
logic"), the outcome should always be the same, regardless of the person
who is performing the logical operations based on the set of facts.
Any deviation from a convergent outcome here can be attributed to
errors of reasoning.
4) Certain types of cognitive processes are predictable in rough
outline but not in detail. Emotional states and responses are of this
type, and as we have seen, they are mediated by chemistry. In response
to a physical stimulus or a social stimulus from another person, we
experience emotional reactions, and these reactions are difficult but
not impossible to control and modify.
For example we say things like, "such-and-such made me feel
(whatever)," or "that pushed my buttons," etc. Where the responses are
unhealthy or maladaptive, we might seek psychological therapy to learn
new responses that are healthier and more adaptive. Or we might simply
choose to make an effort to modify our responses. In some cases we can
do so effectively (for example verbal responses to statements by loved
ones); in other cases, less so or not at all (for example post-traumatic
stress responses to stimuli such as sudden loud noises).
5) Certain types of cognitive processes and behaviors may or may not
be predictable but in any case are clearly subject to choice. A large
number of these choices fall into the category of "moral choices and
behaviors." Others may include entirely mundane choices that people
make all the time without much effort.
Another category may include "creative acts" such as writing a novel
or composing a song, where the output of the process is a new artistic
work or even a new scientific theory, that is entirely new to the
individual who creates it. For example, there are thousands of "love
songs" and a songwriter may inadvertently compose one that already
exists but s/he is unaware of it already existing. As well, history is
replete with examples of two or more people simultaneously inventing a
new device or proposing a new scientific theory, each person unaware of
the others doing so.
However, very often, one person or a group working together, come up
with a new creative product that has not yet existed in human history.
Although most such cases can be said to have built upon what has come
before them (e.g. Einstein sought to extend Newton, a novelist or film
maker seeks to extend a genre), the fact that some of the elements are
new is irreducible: something has been created that did not exist
before.
6) The fact that a computer cannot predict the outcome of its own
computation is not a viable counterexample. One computer, having
completed a given computation, is capable of predicting the output of a
second computer that is just beginning the same computation. Thus by
this analogy, if a person cannot predict the outcome of her/his own
choice, a second person who has already made that choice is positioned
to attempt to predict the outcome of the first person's choice. As we
see in common use, and in empirical experiments on the behavior of
humans and other animals, such attempts at second- and third-person
prediction are occasionally precisely correct, occasionally only
imprecisely correct, and occasionally entirely incorrect. All three of
these outcomes are important and meaningful as regards the question of
free will.
7) Any given instance of the subjective sensation of "making a
choice" may be objectively valid or invalid. The fact that the
sensation of "making a choice" is occasionally objectively invalid (e.g.
the outcome of the choice is precisely predictable by second- and
third- persons), does not by itself support the conclusion that all
instances of "making a choice" are objectively invalid.
8) The position of "no free will" is that there are
exactly zero and no more
instances of free will, that free will is a-priori impossible, and that
any instance of free will whatsoever is precluded by hard determinism.
9) The easy counter-arguement, in favor of free will, that "no free
will" entails seeking to "prove a negative," something conventionally
said to be impossible, is not necessary. The existence of indeterminacy
in neural computation is a far stronger counter-arguement because it is
based on empirically observable phenomena in-vitro (Hameroff et.al.).
10) The most accurate statement one can arrive at, based on the empirical findings and supported theories to date, is:
Some cognitive processes are hard-deterministic, some are chaotically
determined but unpredictable, and some are freely-willed.
Consciousness as-experienced, and behavior as-observed, is the result
of the interaction of these three categories of processes.
Therefore free will exists in some measure, but not in complete measure.
The quantity of free will is greater than 0% and less than 100%. This
is the basis for ongoing philosophical, religious, and political
differences of opinion on issues of moral behavior.
11) At present we do not know how much of human thought, feeling,
and behavior, is attributable to deterministic causality, and how much
is attributable to free will.
My guess, primarily intuitive but based in the facts and findings, is
that probably around 10% of human thought, feeling, and behavior, is
the product of free will. However, 10% is still greater than 0. The
mere fact of the existence of any quantity of free will, is important in
science, metaphysics, philosophy, religion, interpersonal and social
relations, and politics and policy.
-----------------------------
Part 5, Opponents of Free Will -- Conclusion
1) The belief that free will is equal to zero, that it does not
exist even in the smallest measure, is the outcome of subjective biases.
2) One category of bias comes from opposition to conventional
religion. In the Abrahamic traditions, free will is said to be a gift
of God to Humankind. Those who are strongly opposed to the existence of
a deity, occasionally make the logic error of also opposing anything
that is claimed by religion to follow from the existence of a deity.
Since free will is claimed by religion to follow from the existence of a
deity, if a deity does not exist, free will must also not exist.
This line of arguement presupposes that the theistic claims to free
will are the only such claims, and that no other basis for free will is
possible. In effect it subsumes an agreement with a premise, to arrive
at a disagreement about a conclusion: "IF God gave us free will, which
we agree with, AND God does not exist, as we strongly assert, THEN free
will does not exist."
(There's a name for this logic error, that escapes me at the moment;-)
3) The polarization between the extreme religious right and the
science community in general, has produced an increasing degree of
"tribal behavior" on both sides, where rational arguements are
acceptable only in so far as they agree with the tribal belief. This is
the source of some of the apparent "flocking behavior" on both sides of
the issue.
4) Another major source of the "no free will" position is the desire
for immortality by people who reject traditional religious beliefs in
the immortality of the soul, as I'll make clear:
The Singularity is a new religion whose central beliefs are a) Humans
will shortly succeed in building human-level conscious artificial
intelligences (AIs) using existing classical computing architecture
embodied in silicon platforms. b) These AIs will rapidly bootstrap
themselves to a position of de-facto omniscience and omnipotence. c)
Human-level conscious AIs will do all of humanity's work, relieving us
of all obligation to work, and ushering in a new era of complete freedom
from work. d) Consciousness is purely algorithmic and can run on any
sufficiently extensive physical architecture. e) Godlike AIs will be
able to support human consciousness. f) Humans will be able to
"upload" their minds to these machines, thereby escaping death.
5) The tenets of Singularitarianism approximately mirror those of
apocalyptic Christianity: A savior will come, and usher in a utopian
era, and provide believers with eternal life; and these things will
happen within our lifetime.
6) The necessary implications of Singularitarian beliefs (d) through
(f), are that consciousness must necessarily be wholly deterministic,
in order to be viable on a wholly deterministic computing platform.
7) And the necessary implication of (6) is that there is no room
whatsoever for the existence of nondeterministic elements in
consciousness. Since free will is by definition nondeterministic, it
must be wholly excluded from consideration.
8) Singularitarianism got an enormous boost when Google hired its
originator, Ray Kurzweil, as chief engineer with unlimited budget. A
number of Silicon Valley billionaires, including Sergey & Larry at
Google, Mark Zuckerberg, and Larry Ellison, are adherents of
Singularitarianism. (Ellison has a famous quote, "I don't see any
reason why I should die," and that's either verbatim or a very close
paraphrase.)
The high status of these billionaires has given Singularitarianism a
degree of "respectability" that it would otherwise not have. If Ray
Kurzweil were Joe Unknown, and his adherents were various Joe and Jane
Unknowns, the entire thing would be recognized as nothing more than one
of a large number of "new religions" at best or "cults" at worst. Only
the status of the founders and adherents has raised it above that level
of status.
9) It is not surprising that working scientists in unrelated fields
agree with some of the basic tenets of Singularitarianism. This is a
purely social phenomenon that does not reflect on the inherent
correctness or incorrectness of their positions. These individuals may
excel in particular fields, but they do not have the overview of all
relevant fields needed to speak with true authority. For example a
theoretical physicist is not in a position to speak authoritatively
about neuroscience, and a neuroscientist is not in a position to speak
authoritatively about physics.
(Then why oh why am I, another Joe Unknown, making statements about
these things using declarative sentences, when I don't hold any sort of
Ph.D? The answer is that all I'm claiming is the right to hold my own
beliefs and to explain them to others, and that the arguements I make
will stand or fall on their own merits or lack thereof, regardless of my
identity.)
10) However, the root motive for belief in Singularitarianism, is the
same as the root motive for belief in the immortal soul: the desire for
eternal life, one way or another. This subjective bias is
large and it is not acknowledged by most Singularitarians and the
partial adherents of Singularity-based ideas. An unacknowledged
subjective bias is sufficient to call into question the objectivity of
the reasoning that results from it.
11) Once we understand where the opposition to free will is coming
from, we're much better able to make our case against that position, and
in favor of the existence of some measure of free will.
That's the end of the major sections; a couple of minor items may
follow (or may not, I haven't decided yet, freely or otherwise;-)
